

Concurred in by  
DC/SR 13 Dec 62.  
cc in SR/Plans

DRAFT D/PB  
12 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)  
SUBJECT: Unconventional Warfare Requirements in Denied Areas

REFERENCES:

- A. NSC 5412/2
- B. Criteria Paper - 1955
- C. SM-599-56, dated 17 July 1956, Subject: Review of Unconventional Warfare Requirements
- D. SM-1079-59, dated 27 October 1959, Subject: Unconventional Warfare Requirements
- E. Excerpt from DD/P Staff Meeting Minutes - 31 August 1961
- F. Memo for DD/P, dated 14 September 1961, Subject: Project USEFUL and Related UW Requirements Placed upon CIA
- G. Memo for C/WPS, dated 18 September 1961, Subject: Same as "F" above
- H. Memo for DD/P, dated 20 December 1961, Subject: Proposal for Exchange of Views with Elements of DOD and JCS in Regard to UW Assets in Denied Areas (with Attached Proposal)
- I. Memo for the Record, dated 25 June 1962, Subject: Exchange of Views with [ ] and Members of his Staff Regarding the Establishment of UW Assets in Denied Areas within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (with Attachments)
- J. Memo for the Record, dated 27 June 1962, Subject: CIA UW Denied Area Problem and Proposals

1. This memorandum recommends action by the DDCI, as noted in paragraph 5 below.

2. General: CIA's inability to produce UW agent assets in denied areas to meet wartime military unconventional wartime requirements has long been a matter of concern to the JCS, to individual Officers in the field with whom CIA has planning relationships, and to CIA itself.

3. Background:

a. NSC 5412/2 assigns to CIA the responsibility for the development of covert assets, including, whenever practicable, provision of a base upon which the Military may expand in time of war. Further, in the Criteria Paper of 1955, CIA informed the Military of its intention to create and maintain assets to support military operations.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

b. In July 1966, JCS asked CIA to accept requirements to provide wartime UW support to the unified and specified commands. Subsequently, CIA began accepting unconventional warfare requirements from the JCS, based upon theater war plans. The original requirements and acceptances have been revised and refined through three cycles, i. e., 1967 original requirements and first cycle, 1969 second cycle, and 1970 third cycle.

c. In reviewing our acceptances of requirements during the above three cycles, one major problem clearly emerges and that is our inability to develop and maintain in-place agent assets in denied areas in CINCEUR's area of responsibility. We mention CINCEUR's area, because the operational climate within the denied areas of Europe is quite different from that encountered in other areas. Then, too, the JCS have addressed themselves to the EUCOM area in their comments on our ability to accept UW requirements. Therefore, this paper considers the following European countries as denied areas and restricts discussion to those countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and European USSR.

d. In 1967, CINCEUR requirements for denied areas totaled 64. CIA accepted 44. Of the 44, 9 were in place, 1 was programmed in place, and 34 were to be held externally. The 70 percent acceptance was evidently satisfactory to JCS, because we have no record of adverse comments. This is not true, however, for the 1969 cycle. In that cycle, there were 90 UW requirements for denied areas. CIA accepted 65, or 72 percent. The percentage of acceptance was the same as the previous cycle, but our acceptance against assets in place and ready had dropped to 3, i. e., 2 in East Germany and 1 in Poland. In our memorandum of acceptance to the JCS, we indicated to them that we had programs to develop 8 additional assets in place--4 in Czechoslovakia and 4 in East Germany. Forty-one acceptances were based upon agent assets located in the CONUS. JCS, in their SM-1079-69, were critical of CIA's acceptances of CINCEUR's requirements. They pointed out that a large portion of the assets was located in CONUS and not readily available to provide an acceptable D-day capability.

JCS requested that CIA initiate new programs where applicable to assure that assets developed for Priority I UW areas be located, if possible, within the area of potential operations or, as a minimum, within the geographical area of responsibility of the commander concerned. In 1968, CINCPER's requirements for denoted areas dropped to 68. CIA accepted 38, or 53 percent. Of this total, 1 was located in Poland, 33 in CONUS, and 3 in Western Europe.

e. In view of our record in regard to acceptances of military UW requirements and the continuing concern of the JCS, it was recognized in August 1961 that CIA should take the initiative and attempt to arrive at a mutual understanding with JCS as to our capabilities to accept military UW requirements in denoted areas and, in so doing, to provide a positive and practicable solution. To this end, C/WPS briefed the DD/P (Mr. Bissell) and Area Division Chiefs on the problem. At the conclusion of the briefing, Mr. Bissell stated that we needed frank discussion with the JCS of the impracticability of planning for in-place assets. Within the framework of Mr. Bissell's statement, C/WPS suggested the problem be discussed with JCS. In his response to C/WPS, DDPASST asked that C/WPS work out a tentative proposal to the Pentagon. The memorandum also stated that the proposal should consider:

- (1) The infeasibility of CIA or any other agency to hold agents on ice in denoted areas against a hot war.
- (2) The only internal assets who might be available for use in a hot war are those who are currently held and employed in operational tasks.
- (3) We must place our reliance upon externally held assets to be employed as complementary to Special Forces.
- (4) We propose to recruit personnel in CONUS and possibly some foreign countries and form them into a sort of reserve corps to be used with either Special Forces or for CIA missions.

f. After several conferences, C/WPS developed and coordinated a proposal for an exchange of views with JCS. The proposal was approved by the DD/P. C/WPS emphasized that the proposal of placing major reliance upon externally

held assets would call for an increase of effort on the part of CIA, and suggested that the sound and energetic DOB of SR, expanded as to capability and advanced as to readiness, could accomplish all tasks. In regard to the expansion of capability, current requirements for denied countries in CINCEUR's area of responsibility total 66. Of this total, 51 are Priority I and 17 Priority II. Of the total, CIA has accepted 27 in USSR based upon 73 agent assets recruited and trained by SR/DOB and held in CONUS. No assets are available, and CIA has not accepted 19 UW targets in Czechoslovakia, 6 in East Germany, 3 in Hungary, and 9 in Poland. To overcome this short fall, CIA should recruit and train 84 satellite-type agent assets. In regard to advancement of readiness, it is considered that, in order to achieve meaningful readiness, CIA should prepare detailed plans for: alerting and assembling externally held agent assets, stockpiling of clothing, material and equipment, documentation, overseas reception, clandestine communications, case officers, final briefings, and assignment of missions. As a matter of interest, WPS has discussed these planning requirements with SR, OC, OS, DPD, KK, and PE and, at the present time, is developing planning guidance for Area Divisions concerned.

5. C/WPS and his Deputy discussed on an informal basis the proposal with [ ] SACSA, and his Staff on 15 June 1962. [ ] agreed that it was impracticable to establish UW assets in denied areas and accepted, in principle, the alternative of having these assets held externally. In his informal and uncleared memorandum for the record of the meeting with SACSA, C/WPS pointed out [ ] ready acceptance of the hard facts and his desire to see something in being, which, although not ideal, would be a firm capability. C/WPS also reiterated a previous point that JCS acceptance of major reliance upon externally held assets will call for an increase in CIA capabilities and will require considerable planning and organization, both in CONUS and Western Europe by CIA, and to some extent CINCEUR, in order to achieve meaningful readiness.

*SACB*

**4. Proposal:**

a. On 27 June 1962, C/WPS was called by [ ] (SACB Staff), who stated he was returning the proposal statement with no comment. In response to questioning, [ ] indicated that the JCS are prepared to accept the paper as a statement of fact and a reasonable solution to the problem. [ ]

[ ] further commented that he did not know whether the proposal would be acceptable as it moved in a formalized shape up the line, but he noted that [ ] had accepted the paper in principle.

b. It is proposed that the CIA paper on externally held assets be officially forwarded to JCS for their study and comment. Attached at Tab A is a suggested memorandum from the DDCI to the Chairman, JCS, forwarding the paper.

**5. Recommendation:** It is recommended that the DDCI sign the memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, attached at Tab A.

[ ]  
Chief, War Plans Staff

**1 Attachment:**  
Tab A, as stated

**COORDINATION:**

AR	Date
EE	Date
FE	Date
WE	Date
NE	Date
CA/PWG	Date

**SECRET**

**Proposal for Exchange of Views with Ministers of the  
DOD and DIA in regard to POW/MIA Issues  
with the ARCOM Area**

1. **NOTE 5412/2** places the CIA responsibility for POW/MIA issues and lists three types of actions to be taken. Article 10 of note 5412 states, "In accordance with established policies and procedures, the CIA shall be prepared to assist the military services in developing underground resistance and facilitate covert and clandestine operations and ensure availability of these forces in the event of war, including whatever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces in time of war for strengthened defense and evasion and escape facilities." In military terminology, UWE consists of Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, and Interruption (or Intimidation).
2. With the advent of the Special Plan 8000 program, the CIA and the Department of Air Force have been working closely with the Air Force. Military support of the CIA's efforts has been excellent. The Army and Navy also have been helpful in their support of CIA efforts. It would be greatly facilitated if the CIA could present common positions and

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

action which, upon the conclusion of hostilities, would be required under law or custom to support or justify intervention.

b. In responding to MILITARY DRAFT Report, the CIA has listed four types of actions which it could conduct prior to termination of hostilities:

c. Action must be taken which will support the course of potential operations, associated with the preparation and improvement of facilities, and training of personnel in specific types of operations.

d. General liaison, communications, and other administrative support.

e. Small teams of CIA personnel may be required to assist in the conduct of operations with the local resistance, and to provide intelligence and technical advice, and other support services required for the conduct of operations.

f. Agents of a supporting character will be available to provide limited support to responsible members of the Armed Resistance within the operational areas. Such agents will not undertake undertaking specific U.S. tasks but will provide liaison, indoctrination, establish contact with the local resistance, and provide safe havens or other support services.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

The JCS have indicated that they will be able to supply the required number of U.S. paratroopers in time for the first assault wave. They also indicated that they would be able to supply the required number of U.S. paratroopers for the second assault wave. The JCS also indicated that they would be able to supply the required number of U.S. paratroopers for the third assault wave.

In 1969 the number of UW requirements submitted to the CIA by USAMC/USAR initially 100, of which 80 were for personnel assigned overseas. Of the personnel assigned overseas, CIA indicated that 60 were available and 40 were non-assignable. CIA also indicated that 10 personnel were available for assignment overseas. CIA indicated that 60 personnel were available for assignment overseas, of which 50 were available for assignment to Vietnam and 10 were available for assignment to Thailand. CIA indicated that personnel assigned overseas had been assigned to specific units and that they were not permitted to return to a domestic unit. CIA also indicated that personnel assigned overseas were not permitted to return to a domestic unit unless their programmed personnel could fully utilize the personnel slots of the Military Plan (1 July - 30 June). CIA experts believe that personnel have been sent to overseas in more than 50% of the cases the programmed personnel date was not met. As a result, changes have been made to asset development.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

[REDACTED]

In addition, it should appear feasible that CIA can have direct authority to conduct CIA efforts in any area that it deems important enough to justify direct CIA action.

**a. It is determined proposed goals:**

a. It is unlikely to the maximum degree that the proposed goals will be achieved through other means and that CIA's involvement will be required to accomplish the proposed goals.

b. It is likely of achieving the proposed goals through other means and that CIA's involvement will be required to accomplish the proposed goals.

It has been CIA experience, however, that in the area of current interest to you it is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty which

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

with regard to the development of external intelligence assets, CIA proposes to develop clandestine sources or small teams of two or more men who would be infiltrated into the operational areas prior to the final General Political Thaw. These sources would be most necessary to the success of the operation inasmuch as they would be able to serve as guides and informants and thus would have knowledge of the local situation.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

SECRET